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Abstract
We address the value of a baserunner at first base waiting to see if a ball
in play falls in for a hit, before running. When a ball is hit in the air, the
baserunner will usually wait, to gather additional information as to whether
a ball will fall for a hit before deciding to run aggressively. This additional
information guarantees that there will not be a double play and an “unneces-
sary out”. However, waiting could potentially cost the runner the opportunity
to reach third base, or even scoring on the play if the ball falls for a hit. This
in turn affects the probability of scoring at least one run henceforth in the in-
ning. We create a new statistic, the baserunning risk threshold (BRT), which
measures the minimum probability with which the baserunner should be sure
that a ball in play will fall in for a hit, before running without waiting to see if
the ball will be caught, with the goal of scoring at least one run in the inning.
We measure a 0-out and a 1-out version of BRT, both in aggregate, and also
in high leverage situations, where scoring one run is particularly important.
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We show a drop in BRT for pitchers who pitch in more high leverage innings,
and a very low BRT on average for “elite closers”. It follows that baserun-
ners should be frequently running without waiting, and getting thrown out in
double plays regularly to maximize their chances of scoring at least one run.
1 Introduction
Consider the situation of a late inning of a close baseball game, with one out, and
a single baserunner, who is on first base. Assume the batter hits the ball towards
the outfield and it is not clear if the ball will fall in for a hit. The baserunner
typically runs partway towards second base and then waits to see if the outfielder
will catch the ball or not before continuing. We will refer to this strategy as the
conventional baserunning strategy. This strategy is almost always used in order to
prevent a double play. Indeed, if the ball is caught before it touches the ground, the
baserunner must return to first base before the defense can get the ball to first base,
or they are also ruled out, ending the inning. In this situation, standing and waiting
can prevent a double play.
In contrast, when there are two outs, the baserunner has the freedom to run ag-
gressively without waiting. Indeed, if the ball is caught, the inning is over anyway,
so there is no possibility of a double play.
In this paper, we make the case that the 2 out, aggressive baserunning strategy
should be employed with less than two outs in specific situations. In fact, this
aggressive baserunning strategy is almost never used with fewer than two outs. In
the rare cases when it is used, traditional baseball statistics cannot detect it, unless
it results in a double play. Therefore, our arguments are necessarily indirect, rather
than purely statistical.
Assume a runner is on first base in the 9th inning with one out, and a ball is hit to
shallow right field. The outfielder is running very fast, attempting to catch the ball.
Let us say that the probability of a hit is 0.5. Such a probability assessment could be
made by the coaches, or the baserunner, in the time it takes the baserunner to reach
the point where they would conventionally stop (we will discuss the problem of
estimating this probability in Section 4). In Section 2, we show that in this scenario,
they should not stop. Indeed the only way stopping could be beneficial, is if the ball
is actually caught. Therefore, the maximum reward of the conventional baserunning
strategy is exactly one runner on first base, with two outs. We will show that this
reward is relatively insignificant. As a clear example, consider that between the
years of 2003 and 2008, late inning MLB specialist Mariano Rivera pitched in 58
different high leverage innings1 where there was exactly one baserunner, who was
1We define high leverage situations to be either the eighth or ninth inning where the difference
on first base with two outs. None of those 58 runners eventually scored in those
innings. With hindsight, it is clear that no one should have coveted such a reward.
Baserunners would have been better off pretending that there were two outs instead
of one out, to increase their chances of scoring. Indeed, Rivera, is only slightly
better than the average pitcher with a runner on third base and one out.
In the literature, there have been a number of similar questions addressed. In
Tango et al. (2007), Winston (2009), the expected number of runs is shown, for
each configuration of bases occupied, and by the event that occurs. The notion we
are proposing is quite similar in nature to the notion of sacrifice bunting, stealing
bases, or aggressive baserunning (taking an “extra” base) which have been studied
(for example, also in Tango et al. 2007, Click 2006, Winston 2009). It is known, for
example, that bunting reduces the expected runs in general, but can be a good idea
for a poor hitter, or if scoring only one run is desired. In Click, the probability of
scoring at least one run given each base configuration is given. In general, runners
should be far more aggressive in taking an “extra base” than they are in practice
(as in Tango et al., Winston). In Tango et al., the authors calculate the run value
of taking an extra base. In this paper however, we are more concerned with the
opportunities lost by waiting instead of running.
2 Baserunning Risk Threshold
Consider the possibility that there are i outs where i = 0 or i = 1, and as a simpli-
fying assumption, that aggressive baserunning without waiting, from first base, will
result in the runner ending up on third base instead of second base should a ball in
play fall in for a hit. We examine this reward – the offense has a runner on third
base instead of second base.
Definition 1. We define the following, for i ∈ {0, 1}:
• Let Ti be the resulting probability of at least one run scoring later in the (half)
inning, starting from a situation where there is a runner on third base and i
outs (no requirements regarding first and second base).
• Let Si be the probability of at least one run scoring later in the (half) inning,
starting from a situation where there are i outs and a runner on second base,
but no runner on third base (no requirements regarding first base).
• Let Fi be the probability that at least one runner will score later in the inning,
starting from the situation that there are i+1 outs, a runner on first base and
no runners on second or third.
in score is at most one.
We will measure Ti, Si and Fi for each pitcher, as well as in aggregate. To
calculate Ti, as numerator, we use the number of half innings where there was a
runner on third with i outs and the pitcher pitching, and at least one run scores
later on in the half inning. Therefore, even if the scenario occurs more than once
in the same half inning, it is only counted once. As denominator we use the same
value as the numerator plus the number of half innings where the pitcher was in
that situation, and there were zero runs henceforth scored. We calculate Si and Fi
similarly.
Note that the reward for the aggressive strategy with i outs can be measured
by the difference Ti − Si, and that the only possible reward from the conventional
strategy can be measured by Fi (we use the subscript i because Fi is contributing to
the i-out statistic, even though Fi is calculated by examining situations where there
are i+ 1 outs).
Now assume the ball is hit to the outfield and that the probability that the ball
falls for a hit is judged to be p, where 0 ≤ p ≤ 1. The probability that at least one
run scores, using the conventional strategy is:
p · Si + (1− p) · Fi.
The probability that at least one run scores with our proposed aggressive strategy
is:
p · Ti.
Thus, the aggressive strategy is at least as beneficial as the conventional strategy,
with the goal of scoring a run in the inning, whenever:
p · Ti ≥ p · Si + (1− p) · Fi. (1)
Then, BRTi is the minimum value of p for which risky baserunning is at least
as good as the conventional strategy. In the unlikely event that Si ≥ Ti, then it is not
possible that the conventional stradegy would be better than the aggressive strategy.
(Observe that since 0 ≤ p ≤ 1, Equation (1) would have no solution). In this case,
we automatically declare BRTi to equal 1, meaning that one must be completely
certain that the ball will fall in for a hit before running too far away from first base.
If, on the other hand, Si < Ti, then it makes sense to ask: which values of p
make the aggressive strategy at least as good or better? The answer is found by
solving for p in Equation (1):
p ≥ Fi
Fi + Ti − Si (2)
We will therefore define BRT as follows:
Definition 2. For i ∈ {0, 1} (the number of outs), we define the i-out baserunning
risk threshold, (BRTi) as,
BRTi =

Fi
Fi + Ti − Si if Ti − Si > 0,
1 if Ti − Si ≤ 0.
(3)
Note that Ti will almost certainly be bigger than Si, unless our data is insuffi-
cient in the context used, to have confidence in those probabilities in the first place.
If we did not include the second case in Equation (3), then the BRT statistic would
be less than zero if and only if Si > Ti+Fi, which would be undefined if and only if
Si = Ti+Fi, and would be bigger than one if and only if Si > Ti and Si < Ti+Fi.
One of these scenarios, or Si = Ti, is true if and only if Ti − Si ≤ 0, and therefore,
the BRT is mapped to one.
Definition 2 was chosen based on two assumptions:
1. running aggressively without waiting to see if the ball in play is a hit, from
first base, will result in the runner ending up safely at third base,
2. conventional baserunning would result in the baserunner ending up safely at
second base.
Our work shows that in order to maximize the probability of scoring at least one run
under these assumptions, the aggressive baserunning strategy is better than conven-
tional baserunning whenever p ≥ BRT. Without our assumptions the discussion
would be much different. In the event that running aggressively would result in the
original baserunner being thrown out at third, our strategy would not be as effective.
However, it is also possible that running aggressively could be much more effective
as well, if for example, the runner from first could score if they run aggressively.
This point will be discussed further in Section 4.
3 Aggregate and Pitcher BRT Statistics
All data, unless noted otherwise, is from Retrosheet. We will give restrictions on
the data used for the various statistics provided below.
The aggregate BRT1 and BRT0 statistics for all pitchers, in any inning from
1984-2011 appears in Table 1. This suggests that in any inning where the goal
is to score at least one run, if there is one out, then the baserunner should run
without waiting even if there is only a 38% chance that a ball in play fall for a
hit. This is quite clearly less than the conventional strategy (as discussed in Section
T1 = 0.627 T0 = 0.837
S1 = 0.398 S0 = 0.607
F1 = 0.142 F0 = 0.288
BRT1 = 0.382 BRT0 = 0.556
T1 = 0.624 T0 = 0.808
S1 = 0.398 S0 = 0.601
F1 = 0.133 F0 = 0.284
BRT1 = 0.370 BRT0 = 0.578
Table 1: On the left, aggregate statistics for all pitchers in any inning from 1984-
2011, for one and zero out. On the right is a restriction to high leverage situations.
4). Moreover, even if there is zero out, only a 56% chance is required to make not
waiting the best strategy. In addition, we calculate the aggregate statistics for all
pitchers from 1984-2011, in high leverage situations, which we define to be either
the eighth or ninth inning where the difference in score is at most one, also in Table
1.
We next examine BRT by partitioning pitchers based on the number of career
high leverage innings they pitched in their career. In all forthcoming statistics, we
include career statistics in high leverage innings (ending in 2011) from all pitchers
who either retired since 1984, or who are currently active. We include their career
statistics even if they played before 1984, but retired after 1984. We summarize the
data for BRT1 and BRT0 in Table 2.
BRT1 100 150 200 250 300 350+ top 10 saves all plays
cumulative 0.364 0.354 0.305 0.309 0.324 0.298 0.278 0.370
mean 0.425 0.411 0.338 0.329 0.344 0.317 0.302 -
standard dev 0.260 0.237 0.176 0.137 0.117 0.119 0.111 -
BRT0 100 150 200 250 300 350+ top 10 saves all plays
cumulative 0.569 0.576 0.576 0.520 0.518 0.545 0.528 0.578
mean 0.623 0.619 0.645 0.590 0.555 0.574 0.540 -
standard dev 0.263 0.250 0.230 0.254 0.194 0.137 0.107 -
Table 2: We provide the BRT1 (top) and BRT0 (bottom) for pitchers in high leverage
innings. We provide the statistics over all pitchers with career high leverage innings
in the ranges [100, 150), [150, 200), [200, 250), [250, 300), [300, 350) and [350,∞),
as well as the top 10 all time career save leaders (save leaders from Baseball Refer-
ence), and all plays in high leverage situations. For each, we identify the cumulative
statistics (without separating individual pitchers within each set), the mean statis-
tics over all the individual pitchers in each set, and the standard deviation between
pitchers.
Table 2 demonstrates that, on average, the BRT1 is lower when examining sets
of pitchers with fewer career high leverage innings pitched. The cumulative statistic
for the top 10 save leaders provides a BRT1 of .278, which is significantly less than
the statistic of .370 for all pitchers in high leverage situations. Hence, baserunners
should be significantly more aggressive against elite closers.
For the zero out statistic, BRT0 also in Table 2, we also see a tendency for the
BRT0 to be lower for pitchers with more high leverage innings, although there is a
smaller difference in the cumulative BRT0 statistic between all pitchers, and top 10
save leaders (0.578 to 0.528), than for the BRT1 statistic.
In Table 3, we provide each pitcher’s T1, S1, F1 and BRT1 for all pitchers with
350 appearances in high leverage innings. We also collect the earned run average
for each pitcher. The table is ranked in increasing order by BRT1.
Last Name First Name T1 S1 F1 BRT1 ERA
Rivera Mariano 0.595 0.328 0.043 0.139 2.21
Sutter Bruce 0.639 0.336 0.072 0.192 2.83
Orosco Jesse 0.692 0.376 0.078 0.197 3.16
Gossage Rich 0.658 0.354 0.078 0.204 3.57
Righetti Dave 0.667 0.317 0.095 0.214 3.46
Stanton Mike 0.707 0.359 0.099 0.221 3.92
Fingers Rollie 0.638 0.338 0.094 0.239 2.90
Minton Greg 0.543 0.330 0.068 0.243 3.10
Jackson Michael 0.568 0.365 0.067 0.247 3.42
Eckersley Dennis 0.667 0.338 0.117 0.262 3.50
Hoffman Trevor 0.688 0.363 0.123 0.274 2.87
Tekulve Kent 0.585 0.339 0.101 0.291 2.85
McGraw Tug 0.638 0.436 0.084 0.295 3.14
Jones Doug 0.694 0.468 0.094 0.295 3.30
Franco John 0.671 0.330 0.143 0.295 2.62
Smith Lee 0.603 0.283 0.136 0.298 3.03
Reardon Jeff 0.549 0.356 0.082 0.298 3.16
McDowell Roger 0.652 0.371 0.130 0.317 3.30
Jones Todd 0.621 0.359 0.127 0.327 3.97
Plesac Dan 0.591 0.385 0.118 0.363 3.64
Timlin Mike 0.583 0.418 0.121 0.423 3.63
Quisenberry Dan 0.543 0.392 0.115 0.432 2.76
Hernandez Roberto 0.569 0.420 0.144 0.492 3.45
Garber Gene 0.568 0.434 0.146 0.521 3.34
Lavelle Gary 0.607 0.465 0.191 0.573 2.93
Wagner Billy 0.436 0.375 0.084 0.580 2.31
mean 0.614 0.371 0.106 0.317 3.17
Table 3: The table above collects together all BRT1 data for all pitchers with 350
appearances in high leverage innings. Their corresponding T1, S1, F1 contributing
to their BRT1 is also provided. Each pitcher’s career earned run average is also
given, from Baseball Reference. The table is sorted in ascending order by BRT1.
4 Discussion and Concluding Remarks
Many aspects of baseball strategy assume an ability to approximately judge proba-
bilities in real time. For example, when the third base coach decides whether or not
to send a runner home from third base on a sacrifice fly ball, the coach is (perhaps
unwittingly) making a probability estimation that the runner can beat the throw to
home plate, and comparing that to the probability the run will score in some other
way. These estimated probabilities may not be accurately calculated, but they are
likely approximately correct. They may be influenced by actual calculations and
discussions before the game, and they may be adjusted after risks are taken and
then reassessed. Therefore trial and experience helps improve accuracy. The con-
ventional baserunning strategy, as defined in this paper, tacitly assumes that BRT is
equal to 1.
One other method that the baserunner or third base coach could use to estimate
the probability that the ball fall in for a hit is to use batting average on balls in play
(BABIP) in different contexts. If the ball is hit in some particular situation where
the BABIP is greater than the BRT, then the baserunner should run as soon as they
determine that situation is occurring. For example, in Fast (2011), the author cal-
culates the BABIP depending on the horizontal angle of contact off of the bat (data
from 2008). It is demonstrated that if the angle off the bat is between approximately
0 degrees and 23 degrees, then the BABIP is greater than 0.4, which is greater than
the aggregate BRT1. The estimate for the angle off of the bat can be made on con-
tact, perhaps by the third base coach, and if it is less than this upper bound on the
angle, then the runner should run immediately.
We could not tell from the statistical record, how often the aggressive baserun-
ning strategy is employed. However, it seems to be extremely rare. This suggests
that current practice of major league baseball teams is not approximately correct,
in certain situations. By focusing on a shallow hit to right field, with the outfielder
playing deep and running very fast, we have suggested a specific situation where it
is very likely that current practice is not correct. There may be many other situations
where current practice is not approximately correct, but it may be more difficult to
make those determinations, until people start tracking that data necessary to make
that analysis. Suppose a team starts to employ our suggested baserunning strategy.
An observer would then keep track of the number of times that the runner does
not stop. If a double play results, it counts as a failure. If the ball falls in for a hit,
and the observer judges that the runner advanced further from running aggressively,
then it is a success. With such data, much more substantial analysis would be pos-
sible. In other words, we do not know how to analyze our strategy directly, until a
team tries it and records success.
References
Baseball reference. http://www.baseball-reference.com/, 2012. Ex-
tracted January 2012.
Retrosheet. http://www.retrosheet.org/, 2012. Extracted January 2012.
James Click. Baseball between the numbers, chapter 4–2: When is one run worth
more than two? Prospectus Entertainment Ventures LLC, New York, 2006.
Mike Fast. Spinning yarn. http://www.baseballprospectus.com/
article.php?articleid=15562, 2011.
Tom M. Tango, Mitchel G. Lightman, and Andrew E. Dolphin. The Book: Playing
the Percentages in Baseball. Potomac Books, Inc., Virginia, USA, 2007.
Wayne Winston. Mathletics. Princeton University Press, Princeton, 2009.
